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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The nature of the case, statement of facts and course of proceedings are 
set forth in the Respondent's Brief and are incorporated herein by reference. 
The state submits this Supplemental Respondent's Brief to address the Idaho 
Supreme Court's holding in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, _, 327 P.3d 365, 
367 (2014) (reh'g denied) - "that ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel is not a sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a successive 
petition" - and Lopez's claim that "[t]he manner in which post-conviction counsel 
neglected Mr. Lopez's case presents unique and compelling circumstances 
qualifying as 'sufficient reason' under I.C. § 19-4908 to litigate claims inadequate 
raised in his initial post-conviction petition in a successive petition." (Appellant's 
Supp. Brief, p.3 (capitalization altered, balding omitted).) 
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SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
Alleged Ineffective Assistance Of Post-Conviction Counsel- Even If 
Egregious- Is Not A "Sufficient Reason" Under I. C. § 19-4908 For Allowing 
A Successive Petition 
After his initial post-conviction petition was summarily dismissed, Lopez 
filed a successive petition, and an affidavit in support thereof, essentially 
reasserting two of the claims that were contained in his original petition. 
(Compare R., pp.2-10 with #37206 R., pp.4-6.) He also filed a "Motion For 
Leave To File A Successive Petition," asserting ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel as a "sufficient reason" permitting him to relitigate the 
previously dismissed claims in a successive petition. (R., pp.11-15.) The district 
court ultimately dismissed Lopez's second petition as being both untimely and an 
improper successive petition. (R., pp.35-43, 49-52.) 
Citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981), Lopez 
argued in his initial appellate briefing that ineffective assistance of "counsel in an 
initial post-conviction proceeding, that causes a claim to be inadequately 
presented to the court, constitutes a 'sufficient reason' to allow assertion of the 
same claim in a subsequent post-conviction petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908." 
(Appellant's brief, p.16; see also Appellant's reply brief, pp.7-8.) Although 
Palmer was good law when Lopez cited it, the Idaho Supreme Court has since 
explicitly overruled it, holding in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, _, 327 P.3d 
365, 367-71 (2014) (reh'g denied), that, because there is no statutory or 
constitutional right to counsel in a post-conviction proceeding, "ineffective 
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assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-
4908 for allowing a successive petition." 
Lopez acknowledges the holding of Murphy but contends the district court 
erred by dismissing his successive petition because, he argues, "[t]he manner in 
which post-conviction counsel neglected Mr. Lopez's case goes beyond 
ineffective assistance of counsel and, instead, presents unique and compelling 
circumstances that should qualify as 'sufficient reason' under I.C. § 19-4908." 
(Appellant's Supp. Brief, p.3.1) Lopez's argument fails. Lopez had no statutory 
or constitutional right to counsel to pursue the claims in his post-conviction 
petition. Murphy, 156 Idaho at_, 327 P.3d at 370-71. Thus, even assuming, 
as Lopez suggests, that he was effectively deprived of any meaningful 
representation during his initial post-conviction proceedings, such cannot 
constitute a "sufficient reason" for overcoming the successive petition bar of I.C. 
§ 19-4908. See id. at_, 327 P.3d at 371 ("Where there is no right to counsel, 
there can be no deprivation of effective assistance of counsel," nor can a non-
cognizable claim of "ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel" be a "sufficient 
reason" for bringing a successive petition.). 
Nor does the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 
731, 228 P.3d 998 (201 0), relied on by Lopez, mandate a different result. In 
1 Lopez's argument that this case is "unique and compelling" is apparently based 
on counsel providing only an oral response to the state's motion to dismiss, 
rather than a written response or a motion to amend the petition. (See 
Appellant's Supp. Brief, p.2 ("The new attorney appointed for Mr. Lopez did not 
amend his petition or file a written response to the State's motion. . .. [but only] 
presented a very brief oral argument .... ").) 
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Eby, the district court dismissed Eby's post-conviction petition for inactivity after 
Eby's appointed attorneys failed to file an amended petition or otherwise do any 
work on the case for more than two years. Jsi at 732-33, 228 P.3d at 999-1000. 
After learning that the petition had been dismissed, Eby, through newly 
appointed counsel, sought relief from the order of dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
60(b). Jsi at 733-34, 228 P.3d at 1000-01. On appeal from the denial of that 
motion, the Idaho Supreme Court "recognize[d] and reiterate[dJ" that "there is no 
right to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction cases." Jsi at 737, 228 
P.3d at 1004. Nevertheless, "[g]iven the unique status of a post-conviction 
proceeding" as "'the exclusive means for challenging the validity of a conviction 
or sentence other than by direct appeal,"' and "given the complete absence of 
meaningful representation in the only available proceeding for Eby to advance 
constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence," the Eby Court 
concluded that Eby's "case may present the 'unique and compelling 
circumstances' in which I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) relief may well be warranted." Jsi 
(citations omitted). 
That Eby may have been entitled to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) relief based on post-
conviction counsels' failures to provide him with any "meaningful representation" 
does not compel the conclusion, advanced by Lopez, that "the absence of any 
meaningful representation" in an initial post-conviction proceeding must 
"[s]imilarly" "present sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908" for reasserting 
already litigated claims in a successive petition. (See Appellant's Supp. Brief, 
p.4.) The decision in Eby is, by its very terms, "limited in scope" and applies only 
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to requests for Rule 60(b) relief in post-conviction cases. Eby, 148 Idaho at 736, 
228 P.3d at 1003. More specifically, Eby holds that where a district court 
exercises its discretion to appoint post-conviction counsel but counsel does 
nothing, resulting in the dismissal of the petition for inactivity, Rule 60(b)(6) 
confers upon the court the discretion, in the original post-conviction case, to 
determine whether appointed counsel's shortcomings constitute a unique and 
compelling circumstance warranting relief from the order of dismissal. Eby, 148 
Idaho at 734-38, 228 P.3d at 1001-05. Neither the reasoning nor the result of 
Eby have any application where, as here, the claims in the original petition have 
been finally dismissed and the petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel as a basis to relitigate those claims in a successive petition. 
Rather, such circumstance falls squarely under the holding of Murphy- i.e., that 
"ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason under 
I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a successive petition." Murphy, 156 Idaho at _, 
327 P.3d at 367. 
The successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908 expresses a preference for 
the finality of judgments. If a post-conviction petitioner believes appointed 
counsel has failed to provide any meaningful representation then, under Eby, the 
time to challenge counsel's performance is in the original post-conviction action. 
Murphy makes clear, however, that such claims may not be raised in a 
successive post-conviction petition; otherwise, '"claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel in the immediate prior proceeding may be raised ad infinitum."' 
Murphy, 156 Idaho at_, 327 P.3d at 370 (quoting Bejarano v. Warden, 929 
5 
P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1996)). Because ineffective assistance of counsel is not a 
"sufficient reason" for overcoming the successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908, 
and because ineffective assistance of counsel is the only reason Lopez offered 
for reasserting his original post-conviction claims in a successive petition, this 
Court should uphold the district court's order of summary dismissal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, as well as in the initial Brief of 
Respondent, the state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment 
entered upon the summary dismissal of Lopez's successive post-conviction 
petition. 
DATED this 4th day of September, 2014. 
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